The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Regulation B, and Spousal Guarantees: The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District’s Incorrect Decision to Uphold the Validity of Regulation B’s Expanded Definition of “Applicant” in Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc. by Ladendorf, Justin
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 60 
Number 3 Teaching Criminal Procedure (Spring 
2016) 
Article 13 
2016 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Regulation B, and Spousal 
Guarantees: The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District’s Incorrect Decision to Uphold the Validity of Regulation 
B’s Expanded Definition of “Applicant” in Frontenac Bank v. T.R. 
Hughes, Inc. 
Justin Ladendorf 
jladendorf@lewisrice.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Justin Ladendorf, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Regulation B, and Spousal Guarantees: The Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District’s Incorrect Decision to Uphold the Validity of Regulation B’s 
Expanded Definition of “Applicant” in Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 60 St. Louis U. L.J. (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol60/iss3/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, 
please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
553 
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT, REGULATION B, AND 
SPOUSAL GUARANTEES: THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT’S INCORRECT DECISION TO 
UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF REGULATION B’S EXPANDED 
DEFINITION OF “APPLICANT” IN FRONTENAC BANK V. T.R. 
HUGHES, INC. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in 1974 to 
ensure that financial institutions and businesses make credit available on a fair 
and impartial basis without discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.1 
Prior to the passage of the ECOA, women faced difficulties in gaining access 
to credit. For instance, single women had more trouble getting credit than 
single men, creditors were often unwilling to extend credit to a married woman 
in her own name, and women who were divorced or widowed had trouble 
reestablishing credit.2 To eliminate these difficulties and help women gain 
access to credit, the ECOA makes it “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate 
against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status . . . .”3 If a creditor is 
found to have violated the ECOA, the ECOA provides that “[a]ny creditor who 
fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be 
liable to the aggrieved applicant for any actual damages sustained by such 
applicant . . . .”4 
 
 1. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974). 
 2. Gail R. Reizenstein, A Fresh Look at the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 14 AKRON L. 
REV. 215, 216 (1980). 
 3. Equal Credit Opportunity Act § 701(a), 88 Stat. at 1521 (emphasis added) (The 1976 
amendment to the ECOA broadened its coverage by making it unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate against any applicant “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or 
marital status, or age”). The ECOA is currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a). Section 1691e(c) further provides: “Upon application by an 
aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other court of competent 
jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the 
requirements imposed under this subchapter.” Id. § 1691e(c). In Boone National Savings & Loan 
Ass’n v. Crouch, the Missouri Supreme Court discussed § 1691e(c) and stated that “[m]any cases 
have utilized this provision as authority for allowing a debtor to assert violations . . . as a 
counterclaim for recoupment or as an affirmative defense to collection actions even after the 
running of the two year statute of limitations.” Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Crouch, 47 
S.W.3d 371, 374–76 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (internal citations and quotes omitted). While Missouri 
allows for an ECOA violation to be asserted as a counterclaim or as an affirmative defense, other 
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“Congress mandated that the agency charged with overseeing [the] 
ECOA—first the Federal Reserve [Board], now the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau—promulgate regulations to carry out the statute’s 
purposes.”5 Pursuant to this authority, the Federal Reserve Board (“the Board”) 
issued Regulation B (“Reg. B”) to prohibit creditors from discriminating 
against creditworthy applicants on the basis of sex or marital status.6 In 
particular, Reg. B was designed “to curtail the practice of creditors who 
refused to grant a wife’s credit application without a guaranty from her 
husband.”7 Accordingly, Reg. B provides that “a creditor shall not require the 
signature of an applicant’s spouse or other person . . . if the applicant qualifies 
under the creditor’s standards of creditworthiness . . . .”8 Reg. B further 
provides that “[i]f, under a creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the 
personal liability of an additional party is necessary to support the credit 
requested, a creditor may request a . . . guarantor . . . [and] [t]he applicant’s 
spouse may serve as [the guarantor], but the creditor shall not require that the 
spouse be the [guarantor].”9 
At first glance, the ECOA and Reg. B appear to be consistent in that they 
both prohibit creditors from discriminating against credit applicants on the 
basis of sex or marital status. However, the ECOA and Reg. B are inconsistent 
 
courts have held that an alleged ECOA violation cannot be asserted as an affirmative defense. 
The ability, or lack thereof, to assert the ECOA as an affirmative defense has significant 
implications. See Ami L. diLorenzo, Regulation B: How Lenders Can Fight Back Against the 
Affirmative Use of Regulation B, 8 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 215, 217–18 (2000) (“The question 
courts find themselves facing is precisely what form the remedy [for an ECOA violation] should 
take. Debtors attempt to utilize the purported violation as an affirmative defense to payment. The 
reason debtors seek to have the Equal Credit Opportunity Act claim treated as an affirmative 
defense is because this will likely preclude the entry of summary judgment. If the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act claim is treated as an affirmative defense and there is supporting evidence, the 
court is faced with a factual dispute to be resolved at trial. As a result, the guarantor will continue 
to obtain a delay in facing judgment. Lenders, on the other hand, seek to have the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act claim treated as a compulsory counterclaim, thereby permitting the guarantor to 
pursue its claim separately from the lender’s motion for judgment. Treating the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act claim as a counterclaim is strategically significant because the court can grant 
the lender summary judgment on the defaulted obligations despite the potential Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act violation. Moreover, if treated as a counterclaim, the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act cannot be used to declare the underlying obligation void.”). 
 5. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 383 
(6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotes omitted). 
 6. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (2013). 
 7. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
 8. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1). This provision further provides that “[a] creditor shall not deem 
the submission of a joint financial statement or other evidence of jointly held assets as an 
application for joint credit.” Id. 
 9. Id. § 202.7(d)(5) (emphasis added). 
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in how they define the term “applicant.” Under the ECOA, the term 
“applicant” does not include guarantors and is defined as “any person who 
applies to a creditor directly for extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, 
or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an 
amount exceeding a previously established credit limit.”10 Reg. B, however, 
alters the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” to explicitly include guarantors. 
Specifically, Reg. B provides that “applicant” means “any person who requests 
or who has received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any 
person who is or may become contractually reliable regarding an extension of 
credit . . . [including] guarantors . . . .”11 
Reg. B’s broad definition of “applicant” has had significant implications 
for Missouri creditors making loans to commercial enterprises, which are not 
creditworthy.12 In these situations, the personal guaranty of the business owner 
and the business owner’s spouse are part of the transaction. This is because, 
under Missouri law, “co-ownership of property by a husband and wife creates 
a presumption of tenancy by the entirety,” and, as a result, “[a]n execution 
arising from a judgment against one spouse alone cannot affect property held 
by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties.”13 Therefore, the execution 
of the guaranties allows the creditor to reach marital property in the event of 
default and is “sound commercial practice unrelated to any stereotypical view 
of a wife’s role.”14 
But how can creditors lawfully obtain a spouse’s guaranty without 
requiring it? In most cases, creditors sidestep Reg. B by having the applicant 
“offer” the spousal guaranty, which creditors then “accept” instead of 
“require.” This scenario has become commonly referred to as the “Reg. B 
Dance.” But, despite creditors’ deliberate efforts to avoid violating Reg. B’s 
spousal signature provisions, creditors continuously face resistance to their 
efforts to enforce spousal guarantees after husband-business owners default on 
their loans. Specifically, because Reg. B gives applicants and guarantors the 
authority to sue under the ECOA, wife-guarantors are using the ECOA as a 
means to render their spousal guarantees invalid and unenforceable. 
 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2012) (emphasis added). The ECOA’s definition of “applicant” 
has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1974. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 
No. 93-495, § 702(b), 88 Stat. 1521, 1522 (1974). 
 11. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (emphasis added). 
 12. Under the ECOA and Reg. B, business entities are considered “persons” and, therefore, 
qualify as applicants. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(f) (“The term ‘person’ means a natural person, a 
corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership, 
cooperative, or association.”); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(g) (“Business credit refers to extensions of 
credit primarily for business or commercial . . . purposes . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
 13. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 942 n.6 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
 14. Id. at 942–43 n.6. 
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In 2012, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District decided 
Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc.15 The issue presented there was whether 
the Board exceeded the regulatory authority granted to it under the ECOA 
when it changed the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” to include guarantors.16 
Although the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri had 
previously held Reg. B’s expanded definition of “applicant” to be invalid and 
thereby excluded guarantors from the ECOA’s protections,17 the Frontenac 
Bank court upheld the validity of Reg. B’s definition of “applicant,” and 
created a conflict between Missouri state and federal law.18 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Frontenac Bank court relied primarily on the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Boone National Savings & Loan Ass’n v. 
Crouch.19 The court interpreted Boone as holding that “the ECOA could be 
asserted as an affirmative defense by a wife in a creditor’s claim to enforce a 
guaranty.”20 As a result, the court stated that “[w]ithout reason why this Court 
should abandon the doctrine of stare decisis, we follow the binding Missouri 
precedent in Boone,” and it further held that a guarantor is protected by the 
ECOA.21 
In this Note, I argue that the Frontenac Bank court misinterpreted the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Boone because the validity of Reg. B’s 
definition of “applicant” was never raised as an issue in Boone. Consequently, 
the validity of Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” was an open question in 
Missouri when Frontenac Bank was decided by the Missouri Court of Appeals 
for the Eastern District. And, rather than erroneously relying on Boone, the 
Frontenac Bank court should have conducted a Chevron analysis to determine 
(1) whether the ECOA was clear and unambiguous and, if it is not, (2) whether 
the Board’s interpretation of the ECOA was reasonable. This Note conducts 
the analysis that should have been conducted by the Frontenac Bank court, and 
demonstrates that Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” fails under both prongs of 
Chevron (1) because Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed that a 
guarantor does not qualify as an “applicant,” and (2) because the Board’s 
interpretation of the ECOA is unreasonable and “leads to circular and illogical 
results.”22 
Under the first prong of Chevron, Reg. B fails because the term 
“applicant” is unambiguously limited to a person who applies for or requests 
 
 15. Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 404 S.W.3d 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 16. Id. at 290–91. 
 17. Champion Bank v. Reg’l Dev., LLC, No. 4:08CV1807 CDP, 2009 WL 1351122, at *3 
(E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009). 
 18. Frontenac Bank, 404 S.W.3d at 291. 
 19. Id.; Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 20. Frontenac Bank, 404 S.W.3d at 291. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Champion Bank, 2009 WL 1351122, at *3. 
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credit—i.e. a borrower—and does not include a person who simply gives 
security for a borrower’s debt—i.e. a guarantor. Indeed, because guarantors 
base their ECOA claims on allegations that the creditor improperly required 
their guarantee, they are admittedly conceding that they are not applicants 
because they did not apply for or request anything. Under the second prong of 
Chevron, Reg. B fails because it unreasonably impedes the purpose of the 
ECOA, which is to encourage creditors to include, rather than exclude, women 
(especially wives) from credit transactions. Instead, Reg. B discourages 
creditors from considering a wife’s creditworthiness when extending credit to 
the wife’s husband because of the potential risk that the wife’s guarantee will 
be deemed void and unenforceable. Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” also 
leads to circular and illogical results because it allows a guarantor-wife to 
assert that she should not be a member of the class of people Reg. B is 
designed to protect—i.e. guarantors—and simultaneously allows the wife to 
claim rights under the ECOA as a guarantor.23 
Part I of this Note details the background of the ECOA and Reg. B, and 
provides an in-depth analysis of the Frontenac Bank court’s decision. Part II 
examines state and federal case law addressing the validity of Reg. B’s 
definition of “applicant.” Part III explores the legislative history of the ECOA 
in order to shed light on Congress’s purpose in passing the ECOA. Part IV 
asserts that the Frontenac Bank court misinterpreted the Missouri Supreme 
Court’s decision in Boone and should have followed the line of cases which 
have held Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” to be invalid. Specifically, Part IV 
demonstrates that the Board’s expansion of the term “applicant” fails under 
both prongs of the Chevron analysis. Part V concludes that the United States 
Supreme Court should correctly determine that Reg. B’s definition of 
“applicant” is an invalid exercise of the Board’s regulatory authority. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B 
The ECOA was enacted on October 28, 1974, in response to Congress’s 
finding “that there [was] a need to insure that the various financial institutions 
and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise[d] their 
responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without 
discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.”24 Accordingly, the ECOA 
provides that its purpose is “to require that financial institutions and other 
firms engaged in the extension of credit make that credit equally available to 
all creditworthy customers without regard to sex or marital status.”25 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974). 
 25. Id. 
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Ultimately, Congress believed that the ECOA would enhance economic 
stabilization and strengthen competition among financial institutions engaged 
in the extension of credit.26 
To achieve the ECOA’s purpose, Congress made it “unlawful for any 
creditor to discriminate against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital 
status with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.”27 The ECOA defined 
“applicant” as “any person who applies to a creditor directly for extension, 
renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of 
an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously established credit 
limit.”28 In order to ensure the implementation of the ECOA, Congress 
authorized the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System the authority 
to “prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes” of the ECOA.29 
Pursuant to the authority granted to it under the ECOA, the Board 
promulgated Reg. B.30 In accordance with the ECOA, Reg. B provides that its 
purpose “is to promote the availability of credit to all creditworthy applicants 
without regard to . . . sex . . . [or] . . . marital status[.]”31 Under Reg. B, “[a] 
creditor shall not refuse to grant an individual account to a creditworthy 
applicant on the basis of sex, marital status, or any other prohibited basis.”32 
To further the ECOA’s purpose and prevent creditors from forcing married 
women to obtain their husbands’ guarantees when applying for credit, Reg. B 
further provides that “a creditor shall not require the signature of an applicant’s 
spouse or other person . . . if the applicant qualifies under the creditor’s 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. § 701(a), 88 Stat. at 1521 (emphasis added). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2012) (emphasis added). The ECOA’s definition of “applicant” 
has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1974. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act § 702(b), 
88 Stat. at 1522. 
 29. Equal Credit Opportunity Act § 703, 88 Stat. at 1522. The 2010 amendment delegated 
the power to prescribe regulations to implement the ECOA to the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a). Besides the 2010 amendment, the language in this section 
of the ECOA has remained virtually unchanged and provides that the Bureau’s regulations 
May contain but are not limited to such classifications . . . and may provide for such 
adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Bureau 
are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of [the ECOA], to prevent 
circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate or substantiate compliance therewith. 
Id. 
 30. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2013) (“This 
regulation is issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System pursuant to title 
VII (Equal Credit Opportunity Act) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act . . . .”). 
 31. Id. § 202.1(b) (emphasis added). In its entirety, Reg. B provides that its purpose is to 
“promote the availability of credit to all creditworthy applicants without regard to race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age.” Id. 
 32. Id. § 202.7(a). 
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standards of creditworthiness.”33 Reg. B further provides that “[i]f, under a 
creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the personal liability of an additional 
party is necessary to support the credit requested, a creditor may request a . . . 
guarantor . . . [and] [t]he applicant’s spouse may serve as [the guarantor], but 
the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the [guarantor].”34 
In the context of loans to commercial enterprises, the Official Staff 
Commentary of Reg. B provides that: 
[A] creditor may not take [a] business applicant’s marital status into account, 
and may not request information about a married applicant’s spouse except 
when the spouse has some connection to the business . . . [and] [a] creditor 
must comply with the rules that prohibit requiring the spouse to guarantee the 
loan.35 
Additionally, the Official Staff Interpretations of Reg. B provide that: 
[Reg. B] bar[s] a creditor from requiring the signature of a guarantor’s spouse 
just as [it] bar[s] the creditor from requiring the signature of an applicant’s 
spouse. For example, although a creditor may require all officers of a closely 
held corporation to personally guarantee a corporate loan, the creditor may not 
automatically require that spouses of married officers also sign the guarantee. 
If an evaluation of the financial circumstances of an officer indicates that an 
additional signature is necessary, however, the creditor may require the 
signature of another person in appropriate circumstances . . . .36 
As originally adopted, Reg. B was consistent with the ECOA and defined 
“applicant” as “any person who requests or who has received an extension of 
credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may be contractually 
liable regarding an extension of credit other than a guarantor, surety, endorser, 
or similar party.”37 However, in 1986, the Board amended Reg. B and 
redefined an “applicant” as “any person who requests or who has received an 
extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may 
become contractually reliable regarding an extension of credit . . . [including] 
guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties.”38 
The Board proposed to expand the definition of “applicant” to cover 
guarantors “in order to give legal standing to persons who have certain rights 
 
 33. Id. § 202.7(d)(1). This provision further states, “A creditor shall not deem the submission 
of a joint financial statement or other evidence of jointly held assets as an application for joint 
credit.” Id. 
 34. Id. § 202.7(d)(5) (emphasis added). 
 35. Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B; Official Staff Commentary, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 48,018, 48,019 (Nov. 20, 1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 202 and 202a) (emphasis 
added). 
 36. 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, supp. I, para. 7(d)(6). 
 37. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (1985) (emphasis added). See Marine Am. State Bank of 
Bloomington, Ill. v. Lincoln, 433 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Iowa 1988). 
 38. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (2013) (emphasis added). 
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under [Reg. B] but who do not . . . have a legal remedy when there is a 
violation of those rights.”39 According to the Board, “[t]he principal effect of 
[the amendment was] to give guarantors . . . standing under the act to seek 
legal remedies when a violation occurs.”40 The Board further explained, “The 
existing regulation prohibits creditors, in certain situations, from requiring an 
applicant to obtain a guarantor . . . [but] [if] a creditor violates this 
provision . . . a guarantor whose signature has been illegally required currently 
has no legal remedy because . . . the act confers standing to sue only upon an 
‘aggrieved applicant.’”41 The Board’s proposal also stated, “The Board 
believes that no operational problems [will] be created by the proposed 
change.”42 The Board justified its proposal to include guarantors within the 
definition of “applicant” on the basis that “[t]he new provisions may increase 
creditor’s costs by increasing their exposure to litigation . . . [but] this situation 
[will likely] arise infrequently [because] [a]pplicants would normally bring suit 
in their own right; and guarantors . . . would merely join in the lawsuit.”43 In 
the final rule revising Reg. B, the Board stated, “Litigation would increase to 
the extent guarantors sue regarding alleged [Reg. B] signature rule violations, 
and the alleged violations would not have been litigated by applicants 
themselves.”44 The Board also emphasized that the amendment “impose[d] no 
new requirements on creditors.”45 
As a result of Reg. B’s spousal signature provisions and Reg. B’s amended 
definition of “applicant,” creditors have continuously been forced to litigate 
claims made by wife-guarantors. Specifically, Reg. B’s broad definition of 
“applicant” has had significant implications for Missouri creditors making 
loans to commercial enterprises, which are not creditworthy.46 In these 
situations, the personal guaranty of the business owner and the business 
owner’s spouse are part of the transaction. This is because, under Missouri law, 
“co-ownership of property by a husband and wife creates a presumption of 
 
 39. Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B; Official Staff Commentary, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 10,890, 10,890 (proposed Mar. 18, 1985). 
 40. Id. at 10,891. 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). By acknowledging that the ECOA confers standing to sue only 
upon an “aggrieved applicant,” the Board seemingly admitted it was changing, rather than 
interpreting, the ECOA. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 10,896. 
 44. Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B; Official Staff Commentary, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 48,018, 48,025 (Nov. 20, 1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 202 and 202a). 
 45. Id. at 48,018. 
 46. Under the ECOA and Reg. B, business entities are considered “persons” and, therefore, 
qualify as applicants. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(f) (2012) (“The term ‘person’ means a natural 
person, a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, 
partnership, cooperative, or association.”); 12 C.F.R § 202.2(g) (2013) (“Business credit refers to 
extensions of credit primarily for business or commercial . . . purposes . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
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tenancy by the entirety,” and, as a result, “[a]n execution arising from a 
judgment against one spouse alone cannot affect property held by a husband 
and wife as tenants by the entireties.”47 Therefore, the execution of the 
guaranties allows the creditor to reach marital property in the event of default 
and is “sound commercial practice unrelated to any stereotypical view of a 
wife’s role.”48 But how can creditors lawfully obtain a spouse’s guaranty 
without requiring it? In most cases, creditors sidestep Reg. B by having the 
applicant “offer” the spousal guaranty, which creditors then “accept” instead of 
“require.” This scenario has become commonly referred to as the “Reg. B 
Dance.” 
In the following case, Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc.,49 the creditor, 
Frontenac Bank (“Frontenac”), faced that exact scenario. Before extending 
credit to a husband-business owner, Frontenac required the husband to 
personally guarantee the loan. Additionally, Frontenac “accepted” spousal 
guarantees from the husband’s wife. Despite Frontenac’s efforts to comply 
with Reg. B, the wife-guarantor sought to invalidate her guarantees after the 
husband-business owner defaulted on his loans. The wife-guarantor alleged 
that Frontenac “required” her guarantee in violation of the ECOA. As a result, 
the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District was confronted with an 
issue of first impression in Missouri state courts: whether the Board’s 
expansion of the term “applicant” to include guarantors was a valid exercise of 
the Board’s regulatory authority. 
B. Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc. 
T.R. Hughes, Inc. (“Homebuilder”) and Summit Point, L.C. (“Summit”) 
obtained financing from Frontenac in 2003.50 In connection with the financing, 
Homebuilder and Summit entered into loan agreements, which included seven 
promissory notes (“the Notes”).51 Homebuilder and Summit secured the loans 
by executing deeds of trust.52 Additionally, Thomas R. Hughes (“Mr. Hughes”) 
and his wife, Carolyn Hughes (“Ms. Hughes”), personally guaranteed the 
Notes.53 In 2009, Frontenac declared the Notes in default, foreclosed upon the 
real estate,54 and sued Summit, Homebuilder, Mr. Hughes (collectively, 
 
 47. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 942 n.6 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
 48. Id. at 942−43 n.6. 
 49. See Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 404 S.W.3d 272, 276–78, 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 50. Id. at 276. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Frontenac Bank, 404 S.W.3d at 276. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
562 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:553 
“Defendants”), and Ms. Hughes to recover the deficiency balance.55 
Defendants and Ms. Hughes responded by filing several affirmative defenses, 
including the defense that the guarantees were void, invalid, and/or otherwise 
unenforceable because Frontenac violated the ECOA.56 
The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Frontenac and 
against Defendants on Frontenac’s claims relating to the Notes.57 The circuit 
court also entered partial summary judgment in favor of Frontenac and against 
Ms. Hughes, but the court sustained her affirmative defense that Frontenac 
violated the ECOA when Frontenac obtained her personal guarantees.58 At 
trial, the court ruled in favor of Ms. Hughes and concluded her guarantees were 
obtained in violation of the ECOA.59 Specifically, the circuit court found that 
the guarantees “were invalid and unenforceable [and] constituted 
discrimination based on marital status” because Frontenac “wrongfully 
demanded that [Ms. Hughes] execute the guarantees [even though 
Homebuilder and Summit] were independently creditworthy under Frontenac’s 
own standards of creditworthiness.”60 
On review, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District rejected 
Frontenac’s contention that the ECOA does not extend to spousal guarantees 
and affirmed the circuit court’s determination as to Ms. Hughes’s guarantees.61 
The Missouri Supreme Court subsequently declined Frontenac Bank’s motion 
for transfer from the Missouri Court of Appeals.62 
1. Legal Background in Missouri Before Frontenac Bank 
Prior to Frontenac Bank, the Missouri Supreme Court decided Boone 
National Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Crouch in 2001, and addressed the issue of 
whether alleged ECOA violations can be asserted as both a counterclaim and 
affirmative defense after the statute of limitations has run.63 In Boone, Boone 
 
 55. Id. at 276–77. 
 56. Id. at 277. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Frontenac Bank, 404 S.W.3d at 277. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 291. The court determined that Frontenac violated the ECOA (1) when Frontenac 
required Ms. Hughes to execute an unlimited personal guaranty because such a guaranty 
exceeded Reg. B’s exception to the rule against requiring an applicant’s spouse to sign a credit 
instrument if the applicant is independently creditworthy; and (2) when Frontenac deemed Mr. 
Hughes’s submission of joint financial statements as an application for joint credit because the 
ECOA specifically prohibits creditors from deeming the submission of joint statements as an 
application for joint credit. Id. at 289–91. 
 62. Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., SC92989, 2013 Mo. LEXIS 106, at *1 (Mo. Jan. 29, 2013). 
 63. Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 374−76 (Mo. 2001) (en 
banc). Initially, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Boone National on Ms. 
Crouch’s counterclaim and affirmative defenses on the grounds that the counterclaim was barred 
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National Savings and Loan Association (“Boone National”) sued Laura Crouch 
(“Ms. Crouch”) on her guaranty for the business debts of her husband, John A. 
Crouch, M.D. (“Mr. Crouch”).64 In response, Ms. Crouch asserted Boone 
National’s alleged violations of the ECOA as an affirmative defense and a 
counterclaim.65 The Boone court determined that Ms. Crouch’s counterclaim 
was time barred because it was “‘an action’ that was required to be brought 
within the two-year period specified in the [ECOA].”66 Nonetheless, the court 
found that Ms. Crouch could assert the alleged ECOA violations as affirmative 
defenses because the affirmative defenses were “not ‘an action’ that [was] 
being ‘brought.’”67 
Aside from the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Boone, there were 
no reported Missouri cases between 2001 and 2012 where a spousal guaranty 
was invalidated under the ECOA.68 During that time span, however, several 
federal cases found that the Board exceeded its regulatory authority by 
changing Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” to include guarantors and held that 
the ECOA did not apply to spousal guarantees.69 Thus, at the time Frontenac 
Bank came before the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, the 
federal courts’ interpretation of ECOA created a potential conflict on the issue 
of whether the Board exceeded the regulatory authority granted to it under the 
ECOA when it changed the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” to include 
guarantors.70 
2. Frontenac Bank Court’s Analysis 
To determine whether the Board exceeded the regulatory authority granted 
to it under the ECOA when it changed the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” to 
 
under the statute of limitations and the ECOA could not be asserted as an affirmative defense. Id. 
at 372. After opinion, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District ordered the case 
transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court. Id. 
 64. Id. at 372. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 374. 
 67. Id. at 375. The court explained that “[u]nder Missouri law, even though a claim may be 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the essence of the claim may be raised as a 
defense.” Id. The court justified its conclusion by reasoning: 
It would be inconsistent with the equitable relief recognized in the [ECOA] to allow a 
violator to enforce its guaranty claim simply because the victim of the violation had not 
brought an action within the two-year period. In this case, for instance, Ms. Crouch would 
have had to bring an action for violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by 1994, 
which was . . . three years before there was any effort to impose liability upon her for her 
husband’s debts. 
Id. 
 68. Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 404 S.W.3d 272, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 69. Id. at 290−91. 
 70. Id. at 290. 
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include guarantors, the Frontenac Bank court began its analysis by reviewing 
the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Boone.71 The court interpreted 
Boone as holding that “the ECOA could be asserted as an affirmative defense 
by a wife in a creditor’s claim to enforce a guaranty.”72 Despite the Frontenac 
Bank court’s determination that the Missouri Supreme Court had already 
answered the precise issue presented, the court continued its analysis and 
addressed Frontenac’s argument that the court should abandon Boone and 
follow various federal cases decided since Boone that held the ECOA did not 
apply to spousal guarantees.73 Specifically, Frontenac argued that the federal 
cases “rejected the extension of the ECOA and its governing regulations to 
spousal guarantees as being in excess of regulatory authority based on the 
express language in the [ECOA].”74 In response to Frontenac’s argument, the 
court reviewed the definition of “applicant” under the ECOA and Reg. B, and 
emphasized that Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” explicitly includes 
“guarantors.”75 Based on Boone and Reg. B’s definition of “applicant,” the 
court reasoned that there was no reason why it should abandon the doctrine of 
stare decisis, and it concluded that Ms. Hughes was protected by the ECOA as 
a guarantor.76 
II.  STATE AND FEDERAL CASE LAW ADDRESSING THE VALIDITY OF 
REGULATION B 
A. State and Federal Courts Initially Assumed the Validity of Regulation B 
After the Board amended Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” to include 
guarantors, state and federal courts assumed that the amendment was a valid 
exercise of the regulatory authority granted to the Board under the ECOA.77 
For instance, in 1988, the Iowa Supreme Court decided Marine American 
State Bank of Bloomington, Ill. v. Lincoln, and implied that the amendment 
was a valid exercise of the Board’s authority.78 Although the court there held 
that the plaintiff did not have standing under the ECOA as a “guarantor, surety, 
endorser, or similar party” since the amendment did not apply retroactively, the 
court explained that the amendment represented a “substantive change” in the 
 
 71. Id. at 291. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Frontenac Bank, 404 S.W.3d at 291. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Inv’r Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995); FDIC v. 
Medmark, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 511, 514 (D. Kan. 1995); Douglas Cty. Nat’l Bank v. Pfeiff, 809 
P.2d 1100, 1102−03 (Colo. App. 1991); Marine Am. State Bank of Bloomington, Ill. v. Lincoln, 
433 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Iowa 1988). 
 78. Lincoln, 433 N.W.2d at 713. 
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definition of “applicant” under the ECOA, and it suggested that a similarly 
situated plaintiff would have authority to sue under the ECOA for violations 
occurring after the amendment took effect in 1986.79 Likewise, in 1991, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals decided Douglas County National Bank v. Pfeiff 
and rejected the defendant bank’s argument that a guarantor was not an 
“applicant” under the ECOA.80 Instead, the court held that guarantors do have 
authority to sue under the ECOA.81 In determining that the bank’s argument 
had “no merit,” the court explained that the principal purpose of the 
amendment was to give guarantors authority to seek legal remedies when an 
ECOA violation occurs.82 
In accordance with these state courts, federal courts similarly deferred to 
the Board’s amendment and assumed Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” was 
valid.83 In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
decided Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P. and rejected a 
creditor’s contention that a guarantor-wife lacked the authority to sue under the 
ECOA.84 Like the state courts, the Third Circuit did not explicitly address the 
validity of the Board’s amendment to the definition of “applicant.”85 
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit implied that the amendment was valid.86 
Specifically, the Third Circuit relied on the district court’s conclusions that 
“the ECOA has from its inception prohibited requiring spousal guaranties” 
and, therefore, “conferring standing upon guarantors places no additional 
requirements upon creditors . . . .”87 Similarly, in FDIC v. Medmark, Inc., the 
United States District Court for the District of Kansas held that a guarantor-
wife could “use [an] alleged ECOA violation defensively to obtain relief from 
her obligation under [a] guaranty . . . .”88 Although the defendant-bank did not 
argue that a guarantor lacks the authority to assert a violation of the ECOA, the 
court implicitly gave deference to the Board’s expanded definition of 
“applicant” and assumed it was a valid exercise of the Board’s regulatory 
authority.89 Specifically, the court noted that the ECOA provides an “aggrieved 
applicant” the authority to recover damages for a violation and explained that 
 
 79. Id. at 712–13 (emphasis added). 
 80. Pfeiff, 809 P.2d at 1102. 
 81. Id. at 1102–03. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Inv’r Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995); FDIC v. 
Medmark, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 511, 514 (D. Kan. 1995). 
 84. Silverman, 51 F.3d at 31. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Medmark, 897 F. Supp. at 514. 
 89. Id. 
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“[t]he term applicant encompasses any person who is or may become 
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit, including guarantors.”90 
B. Courts Begin to Split Over the Validity of Regulation B’s Definition of 
“Applicant” 
Notwithstanding the deference state and federal courts initially gave to the 
Board’s amended definition of “applicant,” the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit questioned the validity of Reg. B’s definition of 
“applicant” and the applicability of the ECOA to spousal guarantees in Moran 
Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Market Development Co., LLC.91 Similar to 
Frontenac Bank, Moran Foods involved a scenario where a wife guaranteed 
her husband’s debt so that his business could obtain credit.92 After the business 
defaulted on its loans, the creditor sought to enforce the wife’s personal 
guarantee.93 In response, the wife counterclaimed and asserted that her 
guarantee was unenforceable because it was obtained in violation of the 
ECOA.94 The Seventh Circuit ultimately found the wife’s counterclaim failed 
because she could not prove discrimination on the basis of sex or marital 
status.95 However, before reaching that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit 
expressed concerns about the legitimacy of a guarantor’s ECOA claim 
stemming from an alleged Reg. B violation.96 In assessing the validity of such 
a claim, the Seventh Circuit noted, “At first blush, the [ECOA] has no 
relevance to this case” because the wife “was not an applicant for credit, and 
neither received credit nor was denied it.”97 The Seventh Circuit explained that 
the ECOA was intended to forbid creditors from “deny[ing] credit to a woman 
on the basis of a belief that she would not be a good credit risk because she 
would by distracted by child care or some other stereotypically female 
responsibility.”98 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that: 
  The Federal Reserve Board, however, has defined “applicant” for credit 
(the term in the statute) to include a guarantor. We doubt that the statute can be 
stretched far enough to allow this interpretation. It is true that courts defer to 
administrative interpretations of statutes when a statute is ambiguous, and that 
this precept applies to the Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation of ambiguous 
provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. But there is nothing 
 
 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atl. Mkt. Dev. Co., LLC, 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 437. 
 94. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the creditor, Moran, but the 
jury found in favor of the wife on her counterclaim. Id. 
 95. Id. at 442. 
 96. Moran Foods, 476 F.3d at 441. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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ambiguous about “applicant” and no way to confuse an applicant with a 
guarantor. What is more, to interpret “applicant” as embracing “guarantor” 
opens vistas of liability that the Congress that enacted the Act would have been 
unlikely to accept.99 
Two years after the Seventh Circuit questioned the validity of Reg. B’s 
definition of “applicant,” the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Missouri, a lower court within the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, decided Champion Bank v. Regional Development, LLC and 
became the first court to explicitly hold that the ECOA does not apply to 
spousal guarantees.100 The factual scenario presented in Champion Bank was 
identical to Moran Foods and Frontenac Bank.101 Relying on the reasoning 
articulated by the Seventh Circuit, the Champion Bank court explained that a 
“guarantor is not an applicant because a guarantor does not, by definition, 
apply for anything.”102 The court reasoned that extending the protections of the 
ECOA to spousal guarantees is unreasonable because it “expands the ECOA 
beyond its intended purpose and leads to circular and illogical results.”103 The 
court further reasoned that Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” “leads to circular 
and illogical results” because it is difficult to conceive how a guarantor can 
claim to have been discriminated against because “a guarantor cannot be 
denied credit for which he or she did not apply.”104 Finally, the court explained 
that extending the ECOA’s protections to a guarantor “leads to circular and 
illogical results” because it allows a guarantor to claim rights under the ECOA 
while simultaneously allowing a guarantor to assert that she should not be a 
member of the class of people the ECOA is designed to protect.105 
Thereafter, in January 2013, the Federal District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri, also a lower court within the Eighth Circuit, decided 
Arvest Bank v. Uppalapati and explicitly declined to follow Frontenac 
Bank.106 Instead, the Arvest Bank court adopted the reasoning articulated by the 
Seventh Circuit and the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Missouri, and held that guarantors do not have authority to sue under the 
ECOA.107 In its analysis, the Arvest Bank court explained that when a court 
 
 99. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 100. Champion Bank v. Reg’l Dev., LLC, No. 4:08CV1807 CDP, 2009 WL 1351122, at *3 
(E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009). 
 101. Id.; cf. Moran Foods, 476 F.3d at 437; Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 404 S.W.3d 
272 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 102. Champion Bank, 2009 WL 1351122, at *2. 
 103. Id. at *3. 
 104. Id. at *2–3. 
 105. Id. at *3. 
 106. Arvest Bank v. Uppalapati, No. 11-03175-CV-S-DGK, 2013 WL 85336, at *4 (W.D. 
Mo. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 107. Id. 
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assesses the validity of an administrative regulation, the court must (1) 
determine whether the intent of Congress is clear and, if it is not, (2) determine 
whether the contested regulation is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.108 After determining the Eight Circuit had not addressed the validity of 
Reg. B, the Arvest Bank court looked to the rationale provided in Moran Foods 
and Champion Bank, and concluded that the Board exceeded its authority 
because (1) there was nothing ambiguous about the ECOA’s definition of 
“applicant” and (2) interpreting “applicant” to include guarantors was an 
impermissible expansion of the ECOA.109 Shortly after the Arvest Bank 
decision, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
reaffirmed its position in Smithville 169 v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. and again 
held that the ECOA does not extend to spousal guarantees.110 
Despite the decisions by the Seventh Circuit and the federal district courts 
in Missouri that rejected the validity of Reg. B, federal courts in other 
jurisdictions determined that Reg. B was valid111 and deferred to the Board’s 
expanded definition of “applicant.”112 For example, in LOL Finance Co. v. F.J. 
Faison, Jr. Revocable Trust, the Federal District Court for the District of 
Minnesota, another lower federal court within the Eighth Circuit, explicitly 
declined to follow Moran Foods and Champion Bank.113 Without providing 
any analysis, the court simply explained that it was “wary of categorically 
discounting the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulations.”114 Likewise, in Citgo 
Petroleum Corp. v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., the Federal District Court for the 
Northern District of Oklahoma, a lower federal court within the Tenth Circuit, 
 
 108. Id. at *3; see Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
n.9 (1984). 
 109. Arvest Bank, 2013 WL 85336, at *3–4. Before deciding to follow Moran Foods and 
Champion Bank, the court reviewed several cases, including Frontenac Bank, which explicitly 
rejected Moran Foods and Champion Bank. Id. at *4; see, e.g., Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Bulk 
Petroleum Corp., No. 08-CV-654-TCK-PJC, 2010 WL 3931496, at *9 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2010) 
(“This Court declines to follow Moran and adher[ing] to Regulation B” because “[t]he court’s 
holding in Moran eliminates entire aspects of the Federal Reserve Board’s implementation 
scheme” that “consumers have come to rely on” and that “creditors have been trained to 
follow.”). 
 110. Smithville 169 v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., No. 4:11-CV-0872-DGK, 2013 WL 
434044, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2013). 
 111. Res-Mo Springfield, LLC v. Tuscany Props., LLC, No. 13-2169-EFM-DJW, 2013 WL 
3991794, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 5, 2013); Citgo Petroleum, 2010 WL 3931496, at *9; LOL Fin. Co. 
v. F.J. Faison, Jr. Revocable Trust, No. 09-741 (JRT/RLE), 2010 WL 3118630, at *7 (D. Minn. 
July 13, 2010). 
 112. Res-Mo Springfield, 2013 WL 3991794, at *3; Citgo Petroleum, 2010 WL 3931496, at 
*8; LOL Fin., 2010 WL 3118630, at *7. 
 113. LOL Fin., 2010 WL 3118630, at *7. 
 114. Id. 
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“decline[d] to follow Moran [Foods] and adhere[d] to Regulation B . . . .”115 In 
doing so, the Citgo Petroleum court concluded that “guarantors who are 
required to sign a guaranty in connection with an extension of credit covered 
by the ECOA will continue to receive protection.”116 The court also justified its 
decision not to follow Moran Foods by explaining that Moran Foods 
“eliminates entire aspects of the Federal Reserve Board’s implementation 
scheme” that “[c]onsumers have come to rely upon” and that “creditors have 
been trained to follow.”117 The court concluded its analysis by stating that 
“[u]nless and until the Tenth Circuit mandates that the Federal Reserve 
Board’s definitions and implementation scheme indeed run afoul of 
congressional intent, this Court adheres to Regulation B, Silverman, and other 
similar cases extending the ECOA’s protections to guarantors.”118 
C. The Circuit Split 
In 2014, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits became the first Federal Courts of 
Appeals to explicitly address the issue of whether the Board exceeded the 
regulatory authority granted to it under the ECOA when it changed the 
ECOA’s definition of “applicant” to include guarantors. The courts ultimately 
reached different conclusions, thereby creating a circuit split and setting the 
stage for the Supreme Court of the United States to resolve the issue. 
1. The Sixth Circuit Upholds the Validity of Regulation B 
First, in June 2014, the Sixth Circuit decided RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. 
Bridgemill Commons Development Group, LLC. In Bridgemill, the Sixth 
Circuit was presented with the same factual scenario that was presented in 
Frontenac Bank: a wife guaranteed her husband’s debt so that his business 
could obtain credit, and, after the business defaulted on its loans and the 
creditor sought to enforce the wife’s personal guarantee, the wife asserted that 
her guarantee was unenforceable because it was obtained in violation of the 
ECOA.119 To resolve the case, the court had to conduct a Chevron analysis to 
determine the validity of the Board’s amended definition of “applicant.” 
First, the court explained that the proper inquiry under step one of Chevron 
is “whether [the] ECOA’s definition of ‘applicant’ unambiguously excludes 
 
 115. Citgo Petroleum, 2010 WL 3931496, at *9. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; see also Res-Mo Springfield, LLC v. Tuscany Props., LLC, No. 13-2169-EFM-
DJW, 2013 WL 3991794, at *3 n.21 (D. Kan. Aug. 5, 2013) (citing Moran Foods and Citgo 
Petroleum to demonstrate that there is “dispute as to whether a guarantor qualifies as an 
‘applicant’ for the purposes of the ECOA” but declining to resolve the issue). 
 119. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 382–
83 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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guarantors, or whether the [ECOA] is ambiguous on this issue.” In conducting 
step one, the court focused on what it referred to as “two broad terms” in the 
ECOA’s definition of “applicant”—”applies” and “credit.”120 First, the court 
defined “applies” to mean “to make an appeal or a request esp. formally and 
often in writing and usu. for something to benefit oneself,” or “[t]o make an 
approach to (a person) for information or aid; to have recourse or make 
application to, to appeal to; to make a (formal) request for.”121 The court 
reasoned that although “[a] guarantor does not traditionally approach a creditor 
herself asking for credit[,] . . . a guarantor does formally approach a creditor in 
the sense that the guarantor offers up her own personal liability to the creditor 
if the borrower defaults.”122 According to the court, although the ECOA could 
permissibly be read to mean that only the initial applicant can be deemed to 
“apply” for credit, “the text could just as easily encompass all those who offer 
promises in support of an application—including guarantors, who make formal 
requests for aid in the form of credit for a third party.”123 Second, the court 
honed in on the term “credit” and noted that the ECOA defines “credit” as “the 
right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt . . . .”124 The 
court reasoned that this definition demonstrated that “an ‘applicant’ requests 
credit, but a ‘debtor’ reaps the benefit.”125 According to the court, “[t]he use of 
these two different terms suggests that the applicant and the debtor are not 
always the same person[] . . . [and therefore] . . . it would be reasonable to 
conclude that the applicant could be a third party, such as a guarantor.”126 
Accordingly, the court concluded “that the statutory definition [of ‘applicant’] 
is ambiguous because it could be read to include third parties who do not 
initiate an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves—a 
category that includes guarantors.”127 
The court then moved on to step two of Chevron and noted that “[its] task 
at Chevron step two [was] to determine whether [Reg. B] stems from a 
permissible construction of the [ECOA].”128 Ultimately, the court found that 
“[s]ince ‘at least one of the natural meanings’ of applicant includes guarantors, 
we conclude that ‘the agency’s interpretation [ ] represents a permissible one 
entitled to deference.’”129 The court supported its conclusion by explaining that 
 
 120. Id. at 385; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2012). 
 121. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 385 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 385. 
 127. Id. at 384–85. 
 128. Id. at 385. 
 129. Id. (quoting Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 467 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
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the Board acted with caution in amending Reg. B’s definition of “applicant.”130 
The court also dismissed the Moran Foods court’s rationale and explained: 
[W]e are not troubled by the prospect of guarantors being made whole after a 
creditor violates the [ECOA] . . . [because] [a] creditor will only lose its entire 
debt if the borrower immediately defaults and the pledged collateral turns out 
to be worthless [and, therefore,] [w]e will not strike down a valid regulation to 
salvage bad underwriting.131 
The court further supported its decision by emphasizing that “[the] ECOA has 
undergone several amendments since the Federal Reserve included guarantors 
within the definition of ‘applicant’—including an extensive amendment to the 
statute after Moran [Foods] was decided—and none has clarified that the term 
‘applicant’ cannot include guarantors.”132 
Therefore, the court held that “[Reg.] B’s definition of ‘applicant’ 
constitutes a valid construction of the statutory definition of that term[] [and] 
[a] guarantor may therefore seek relief for violations of the spouse-guarantor 
rule.”133 
2.  The Eighth Circuit Rejects Bridgemill and Holds Regulation B Invalid 
Shortly after Bridgemill, in August 2014, the Eighth Circuit decided 
Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore.134 The factual scenario in Hawkins 
was identical to Bridgemill.135 Thus, like Bridgemill, the court conducted a 
Chevron analysis.136 Ultimately, the court rejected the Bridgemill decision and 
resolved the case under step one of Chevron by holding that “the text of the 
ECOA clearly provides that a person does not qualify as an applicant under the 
statute solely by virtue of executing a guaranty to secure the debt of 
another.”137 
Like the Bridgemill court, the Hawkins court’s analysis under Chevron step 
one focused on the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” and its use of the term 
“appl[y].”138 Essentially, the Hawkins court agreed with the Bridgemill court 
that “apply” means “to make an appeal or request esp[ecially] formally and 
often in writing and usu[ally] for something of benefit to oneself.”139 However, 
the Hawkins court reasoned: 
 
 130. Id. at 386. 
 131. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 386. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 940. 
 137. Id. at 941. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941 (internal quotes omitted). 
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[T]he plain language of the ECOA unmistakably provides that a person is an 
applicant only if she requests credit. But a person does not, by executing a 
guaranty, request credit. A “guaranty” . . . [is] a promise to answer for another 
person’s debt, default, or failure to perform. More specifically, a guaranty is an 
undertaking by a guarantor to answer for payment of some debt, or 
performance of some contract, of another person in the event of default. A 
guaranty is collateral and secondary to the underlying loan transaction between 
the lender and the borrower. While a guarantor no doubt desires for a lender to 
extend credit to a borrower, it does not follow from the execution of a guaranty 
that a guarantor has requested credit or otherwise been involved in applying for 
credit. Thus, a guarantor does not request credit and therefore cannot qualify 
as an applicant under the unambiguous text of the ECOA.140 
The court then acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit had reached a contrary 
conclusion in Bridgemill.141 The court explained that it agreed with the Sixth 
Circuit that a guarantor does not approach a creditor herself for credit and that 
a guarantor is a third party to the larger application process.142 But, contrary to 
the Sixth Circuit, the court explained: 
[T]his ends the inquiry [for us] because it demonstrates that a guarantor 
unambiguously does not request credit. “Where Congress has manifested its 
intention, we may not manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat that 
intent” . . . . We find it to be unambiguous that assuming a secondary, 
contingent liability does not amount to a request for credit. A guarantor 
engages in different conduct, receives different benefits, and exposes herself to 
different legal consequences than does a credit applicant. “[T]here is nothing 
ambiguous about ‘applicant’ and no way to confuse an applicant with a 
guarantor.”143 
To conclude, the court emphasized that its interpretation of the ECOA 
“comport[ed] with the purposes and policies underlying the ECOA.”144 The 
court noted that the ECOA’s focus was to ensure “fair access to credit by 
preventing lenders from excluding borrowers from the credit market based on 
the borrowers’ marital status.”145 The court then explained that this concern is 
not raised by the execution of a spousal guaranty because, “[b]y requesting . . . 
a guaranty, a lender does not thereby exclude the guarantor from the lending 
process or deny the guarantor access to credit.”146 
 
 140. Id. (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 941–42 (internal citations omitted). 
 144. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 942. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. Judge Colloton wrote a concurring opinion that provides additional analysis to 
support Judge Gruender’s majority opinion. Id. at 943. The concurrence noted that the ordinary 
meaning of an “applicant” is one who requests something for her own benefit, not for the benefit 
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3. The Supreme Court Grants Writ of Certiorari for Hawkins 
After Hawkins created a circuit split on the issue of whether the Board 
exceeded the regulatory authority granted to it under the ECOA when it 
changed the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” to include guarantors, the 
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on March 2, 2015 and 
heard oral arguments in October 2015.147 
III.  THE ECOA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
While the ECOA, as finally enacted, only prevented creditors from 
discriminating against “applicants”—those who “appl[y] to a creditor directly 
for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or appl[y] to a creditor 
indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a 
previously established credit limit”—earlier proposals of the ECOA were more 
expansive and sought to prevent creditors from discriminating against more 
than just “applicants.”148 
For example, on May 23, 1972, the House of Representatives proposed a 
bill that sought to make it “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against 
any person in any extension of credit or in connection with any application for 
credit on the basis of sex or marital status.”149 In that bill, “application for 
credit” was broadly defined as “any communication, either oral, written, or 
otherwise, by a person to a creditor requesting an extension of credit to that 
person or any other person.”150 Between 1972 and 1974, the House and Senate 
continuously proposed new versions of the ECOA, with some proposals 
seeking to narrow the ECOA’s scope and other proposals seeking to expand its 
scope. In a bill introduced on January 3, 1973, the House proposed to narrow 
the scope of the ECOA by making it “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate 
on the basis of sex or marital status against any consumer in connection with 
the approval or denial of any extension of credit.”151 In contrast, in a 
 
of a third party. Id. Furthermore, the statute “specifically envisions the involvement of a third 
party who requests an extension of credit to a first-party applicant, but it distinguishes between 
the third-party requestor and the ‘applicant.’” Id. at 944. Thus, because the ordinary meaning of 
“applicant” comports with the natural reading of the statute, “there is no ambiguity that gives an 
agency license to adopt an alternative definition.” Id. 
 147. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015); Hawkins v. Community 
Bank of Raymore, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hawkins-v-com 
munity-bank-of-raymore/ [http://perma.cc/YWS6-A2Y8] (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). On March 
22, 2016, the judgment was affirmed by an equally divided Court in a per curium opinion. Id. 
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 149. H.R. 15116, 92d Cong. (2d Sess. May 23, 1972) (emphasis added). 
 150. Id. (emphasis added). 
 151. H.R. 247, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. Jan. 3, 1973) (emphasis added); see also S. 867, 93d 
Cong. (1st Sess. Feb. 15, 1973) (proposing to prevent creditors from discriminating against “any 
person on the basis of sex or marital status in connection with the approval or denial of any 
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subsequent bill introduced on May 29, 1973, the House expanded the scope of 
the ECOA further than it had in earlier proposals and sought to make it 
“unlawful for any creditor, card issuer, or other person to discriminate against 
any person on account of sex or marital status in connection with the approval 
or denial of any extension of credit, or with respect to the issuance, renewal, 
denial, or terms of any credit card.”152 
Despite Congress’s initial inability to agree on the scope of the ECOA, the 
House and Senate reached agreement in May 1974. On May 9, 1974, the 
House introduced a bill that proposed to make it “unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status with 
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.”153 Five days later on May 14, 
1974, the Senate introduced a bill that adopted the House’s ECOA 
provisions.154 Then, on October 28, 1974, Congress enacted the final version of 
the ECOA, which included the ECOA provisions agreed to in May 1974.155 
Although amendments that have subsequently been proposed have sought to 
expand the ECOA’s scope, the scope has remained unchanged and has 
continued to protect only “applicants” from discrimination on the basis of sex 
or marital status.156 
As new versions of the ECOA were proposed from 1972 to 1974, reports 
issued by Congress shed light on the scenarios that the ECOA was intended to 
prevent. In a report from June 1973, the Senate identified discriminatory acts 
taken by creditors against women that “established a clear pattern of 
discrimination across the country and on an institutionalized level” and 
demonstrated a need for legislation.157 These acts included: 
(1) [s]ingle women hav[ing] more trouble obtaining credit . . . than single men; 
(2) [c]reditors generally requir[ing] a woman who has credit to reapply for 
credit when she marries, usually in her husband’s name . . .; (3) [c]reditors 
[being] unwilling to extend credit to a married woman in her own name; (4) 
[w]omen who are divorced or widowed hav[ing] trouble reestablishing 
credit . . .; and (5) [c]reditors [being] unwilling to count a wife’s income when 
a married couple applies for credit.158 
The report then listed “examples of practices that constitut[ed] discrimination 
on the basis of sex or marital status if applied to an applicant who [was] 
 
extension of credit”) (emphasis added). The House introduced a provision exactly identical to the 
Senate on February 27, 1973. See H.R. 4734, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. Feb. 27, 1973). 
 152. H.R. 8163, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. May 29, 1973) (emphasis added). 
 153. H.R. 14720, 93d Cong. (2d Sess. May 9, 1974). 
 154. S. 3492, 93d Cong. (2d Sess. May 14, 1974). 
 155. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974). 
 156. See H.R. 14720, 93d Cong. (2d Sess. May 9, 1974). 
 157. S. REP. NO. 93-278, at 16 (1973). 
 158. Id. 
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otherwise creditworthy.”159 Some of those examples included: (1) “[r]equiring 
a newly married woman whose creditworthiness has otherwise remained the 
same to reapply for credit as a new applicant;” (2) “[r]efusing to extend credit 
to a married woman in her own name, even though she would be deemed 
creditworthy if unmarried;” (3) “[r]efusing to count a wife’s income when a 
married couple applies for credit;” (4) “[r]efusing to extend credit to a newly 
separated or divorced woman solely because of her change in marital status;” 
and (5) “[a]pplying stricter standards in the case of married applicants where 
the wife rather than the husband is the primary family supporter.”160 The report 
also included a particular example about “a woman in her forties who as head 
of her household wanted to buy a house for herself and her children and could 
not get a mortgage without the signature of her 70 year old father.”161 As the 
report put it, this demonstrated just another instance where a single woman was 
“flatly informed that mortgage loans were not granted to single persons 
without cosigners.”162 
Remarks by congressmen also shed light on the purpose of the ECOA. For 
example, in May 1974, Congressman Bingham identified specific instances of 
discrimination that women had encountered and provided the following 
example: 
  An unmarried Minneapolis woman in her early 30’s applied to a bank for a 
loan to purchase a summer home. She had enough cash to make a substantial 
down payment and was steadily employed, but her loan application was turned 
down. Yet her fiancé, who had gone through bankruptcy, had no trouble in 
securing a loan to purchase the very same property with a smaller down 
payment.163 
Bingham further explained that women were “the victims of the illogical 
view . . . that women are of marginal economic value.”164 In accordance with 
Bingham’s comments, Congressman Brock remarked that “[c]reditworthy 
women are excluded from transactions because of convention[al] and medieval 
ideas of those who believe women are not as financially reliable as are 
men.”165 To support his position, Brock stated, “Too many credit companies do 
not mind if women pay the bills,” and that “[t]hey object only if the woman 
applies for the credit rating herself.”166 Brock then provided the following 
example: 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 17. 
 161. Id. 
 162. S. REP NO. 93-278, at 17 (1973). 
 163. H.R. 14660, 93d Cong. (2d Sess. May 7, 1974). 
 164. Id. 
 165. S. 3492, 93d Cong. (2d Sess. May 14, 1974). 
 166. Id. (emphasis added). 
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  One married couple applied for a charge card at a department store. The 
wife was earning $6,000 and the husband, being a student, earned only $2,700 
a year. When they applied for the charge, they stated correctly on the 
application that the wife was their main source of income. They were refused 
the charge account, told that company policy prohibited the granting of credit 
either in a woman’s name or to couples where the wife carried the main 
financial responsibility. Thus, although together they earned $8,700, because 
the wife earned most of it, they were considered credit risks. This same couple 
at the same time applied for another charge card—this time at another store 
and in the husband’s name only—and received a charge card shortly 
thereafter.167 
Similar to Bingham and Brock’s views that Congress needed to protect female 
credit applicants, Congressman Sullivan stated, “Our objective is to require 
creditors . . . to make their decisions on the granting or withholding of credit 
on the basis of the individual applicant’s creditworthiness . . . .”168 
IV.  TESTING THE VALIDITY OF REGULATION B 
A. The Frontenac Bank Court Misinterpreted Boone 
The Frontenac Bank court’s rejection of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Moran Foods was based primarily on its misinterpretation of the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s decision in Boone.169 The Frontenac Bank court construed 
Boone as holding that “the ECOA could be asserted as an affirmative defense 
by a wife in a creditor’s claim to enforce a guaranty.”170 Based on its 
determination that guarantors were protected by the ECOA under Boone, the 
Frontenac Bank court mistakenly assumed that the Boone court had addressed 
the issue of whether Reg. B’s expanded definition of “applicant” was a valid 
exercise of the Board’s regulatory authority.171 However, according to the 
author of the Boone opinion, the Honorable Michael A. Wolff,172 the validity 
of Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” was never raised as an issue at the 
summary judgment hearing in the trial court or on appeal before the Boone 
court.173 Rather, the issue before the Boone court was whether alleged ECOA 
violations could be asserted as a counterclaim or affirmative defense after the 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. H.R. 14856, 93d Cong. (2d Sess. May 16, 1974). 
 169. Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 404 S.W.3d 272, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Interview with Michael A. Wolff, Dean, St. Louis Univ. Sch. of Law, in St. Louis, Mo. 
(Dec. 4, 2013). Judge Wolff served on the Missouri Supreme Court from 1998 to 2011, and he 
served as the Chief Justice from 2005 to 2007. Michael Wolff, ST. LOUIS U. SCH. L., 
http://law.slu.edu/people/michael-wolff [http://perma.cc/5A7M-JJ5U] (last visited Jan. 26, 2016). 
 173. Id. 
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statute of limitations had run.174 Consequently, the Boone court was prohibited 
from addressing the validity of Reg. B’s definition of “applicant,” either on its 
own motion or on a motion by the parties.175 Thus, the Boone court was 
obligated to apply Reg. B.176 
Had the Frontenac Bank court correctly construed Boone, the Frontenac 
Bank court would have understood that it had the authority to invalidate Reg. 
B’s definition of “applicant” since the United States Supreme Court had not 
addressed the issue.177 Under Missouri law, courts of Missouri “are bound to 
follow only [the United States] Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the 
federal Constitution and federal statutes.”178 In the absence of any controlling 
authority from either the United States Supreme Court or the Missouri 
Supreme Court, the Frontenac Bank court should have “look[ed] respectfully 
to [lower federal court] opinions for such aid and guidance as may be found 
therein.”179 Instead, the Frontenac Bank court quickly dismissed Frontenac’s 
contention that the court should follow Moran Foods and the other lower 
federal court cases that invalidated Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” without 
providing a thoughtful analysis.180 
Instead of relying solely on Boone, the Frontenac Bank court should have 
conducted a Chevron analysis. The United States Supreme Court has explained 
that the Chevron doctrine applies “when it appears that Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and 
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”181 In regards to determining the validity of Reg. B’s 
definition of “applicant,” the Chevron doctrine applies (1) because the ECOA 
explicitly delegates authority to the Board to make rules carrying the force of 
law since the ECOA provides that the Board “shall prescribe regulations to 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.; see Miller v. Pool & Canfield, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 
(refusing to consider issues not raised during summary judgment hearing because an appellate 
court may not address issues not raised at trial) (citing Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 
31, 36 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)). 
 176. Interview with Michael A. Wolff, supra note 172. State courts are obligated to apply 
federal laws, including administrative regulations, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 177. Interview with Michael A. Wolff, supra note 172. 
 178. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n of Missouri, 688 S.W.2d 344, 347–49 
(Mo. 1985) (en banc) (deferring “to the interpretation rendered by the agency Congress entrusted 
with administration of the statute”). 
 179. Id. at 347. 
 180. Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc., 404 S.W.3d 272, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 181. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“Delegation of such 
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication 
or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional 
intent.”). 
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carry out the purposes of [the ECOA]”182 and (2) because Reg. B was 
promulgated by the Board in the exercise of the regulatory authority granted to 
it under the ECOA.183 
B. Chevron Analysis 
Under the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron: 
  When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.184 
Thus, the Frontenac Bank court should have conducted a Chevron analysis to 
determine (1) whether the ECOA is clear and unambiguous and, if it is not, (2) 
whether the Board’s interpretation of the ECOA is reasonable.185 
1. Step 1: Is the ECOA Clear and Unambiguous? 
The first step of the Chevron analysis would have required the Frontenac 
Bank court to determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
issue of whether a guarantor is an “applicant.”186 To make this determination, 
courts are expected to employ “traditional tools of statutory construction,” 
including the statute’s literal language, legislative history, and purpose.187 
Based on the ECOA’s language, history, and purpose, the Frontenac Bank 
court should have concluded that Congress clearly and unambiguously 
expressed that a guarantor does not qualify as an “applicant.” 
 
 182. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (2012). 
 183. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2013) (“This regulation is issued by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System pursuant to title VII (Equal Credit Opportunity Act) of the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act . . . .”). 
 184. Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 843 n. 9; see Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–95 
(2007) (looking to the technicality of the matter, the history and purpose of the statute, and the 
language); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (looking to the plain language of 
the Act and the Act’s legislative history). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 579 
a. The Language of the ECOA 
The plain language of the statute is the most important consideration in 
determining whether Congress clearly and unambiguously indicated the scope 
of the ECOA’s protections because, if the intent of Congress is clearly and 
unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue, that is the end of 
the analysis.188 
The plain language of the ECOA only protects an “applicant” (“any person 
who applies to a creditor directly for extension, renewal, or continuation of 
credit, or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an 
amount exceeding a previously established credit limit”) from discrimination 
on the basis of sex or marital status.189 While the ECOA’s definition of 
“applicant” is specific to credit applicants, the ECOA’s definition is consistent 
with general dictionary definitions of “applicant” in that they all require an 
individual to personally or formally “request” something.190 In contrast, the 
general dictionary definitions for “guarantor,” a term which is not defined (or 
even mentioned for that matter) in the ECOA, is someone who “gives security 
for a debt.”191 Based on the significant differences in the definitions of 
“applicant” and “guarantor,” it is clear and unambiguous that a guarantor does 
not qualify as an “applicant” under the ECOA because a guarantor does not ask 
for anything but merely promises to assume liability for a loan that an 
“applicant”—i.e. a borrower—requests. Therefore, “[when] taken with 
absolute literalness,”192 the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” does not include 
guarantors because “a guarantor does not, by definition, apply for anything.”193 
Indeed, because guarantors like Ms. Hughes in Frontenac Bank base their 
ECOA claims on allegations that the creditor improperly required their 
guarantee, they are admittedly conceding that they did not apply for or request 
anything. Thus, it is hard to imagine how a guarantor can be considered an 
 
 188. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 189. 15 U.S.C. §1691a(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 190. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 105 (3d ed. 1993) (defining 
an “applicant” as “one who applies for something” or “makes a usu. formal request . . . for 
something of benefit to himself”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (9th ed. 2009) (defining an 
“applicant” as “[o]ne who requests something”). 
 191. See WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 190, at 1007 (defining a 
“guarantor” as “one that makes or gives a guaranty or surety,” and defining “guaranty” as “an 
undertaking to answer for the payment of some debt or the performance of some duty of another 
in case of the failure of such other to pay or perform”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (4th ed. 
1996) (defining “guarantor” as “[one] who makes a guaranty”). 
 192. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 94. 
 193. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atl. Mkt. Dev. Co., LLC, 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Champion Bank v. Reg’l Dev., LLC, No. 4:08CV-1807 CDP, 2009 WL 1351122, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. May 13, 2009). 
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“applicant” for purposes of the ECOA since a guarantor suing under the ECOA 
alleges that she did not apply or request to be a guarantor. 
b. The Legislative History and Purpose of the ECOA 
The legislative history of the ECOA cuts strongly in favor of finding that 
Congress did not intend the protections of the ECOA to extend to guarantors. 
Initial proposals of the ECOA contained language that indicated the ECOA 
might extend to guarantors. Specifically, a bill proposed by the House in June 
1972 sought to make it unlawful for creditors to discriminate against “any 
person” in connection with “any application for credit.”194 Importantly, 
“application for credit” was defined as “any communication, either oral, 
written, or otherwise, by a person to a creditor requesting an extension of credit 
to that person or any other person.”195 Because the proposal sought to protect 
a person who requested credit for any other person, one could reasonably argue 
that the proposal sought to protect guarantors, as well as applicants, from credit 
discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status. However, by the time the 
ECOA was officially enacted in October 1974, the language used by Congress 
significantly narrowed the scope of the ECOA to protect only “applicants”—or 
those who actually applied for credit themselves.196 
Additionally, one particular scenario of discrimination identified by 
Congress prior to the enactment of the ECOA demonstrates that the ECOA 
was not intended to protect guarantors. In a report from June 1973, the Senate 
provided an example of a situation that it hoped to prevent by enacting the 
ECOA.197 That example involved “a woman in her forties who as head of her 
household wanted to buy a house for herself and her children but could not get 
a mortgage without the signature of her 70 year old father.”198 In the words of 
the Senate, this demonstrated just another instance where a single woman was 
“flatly informed that mortgage loans were not granted to single persons 
without cosigners.”199 Tellingly, while the Senate deemed this as an 
unacceptable example of discrimination against a female credit applicant, the 
Senate never once indicated that the woman’s father was being discriminated 
against as a result of his being required to co-sign for, or guarantee, his 
daughter’s loan.200 
Furthermore, remarks made by various congressmen clearly demonstrate 
that the primary purpose of the ECOA was to require creditors to willingly 
 
 194. H.R. 15391, 92d Cong. (2d Sess. June 8, 1972). 
 195. Id. (emphasis added). 
 196. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 703, 88 Stat. 1521, 1522 (1974). 
 197. S. REP. NO. 93-278, at 17–18 (June 28, 1973). 
 198. Id. at 17. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 17–18. 
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include, rather than exclude, women from credit transactions.201 For instance, 
Congressman Brock’s remark that “[c]reditworthy women are excluded from 
transactions because of convention[al] and medieval ideas of those who 
believe women are not as financially reliable as are men” supports the 
inference that women were not only deemed to be unworthy credit applicants 
but also that they were deemed to be unworthy credit guarantors.202 From this 
remark, it can further be inferred that one of the purposes of the ECOA was to 
increase the involvement of women in credit transactions not only as applicants 
but also as guarantors for their husbands. Prior to the enactment of the ECOA, 
it would have been nearly unheard of for a creditor to extend credit to a male 
applicant based on his wife’s willingness to guarantee the loan because 
creditors were reluctant to involve women in any aspect of a credit transaction. 
Thus, while the Congress that enacted the ECOA sought to encourage creditors 
to allow wives to be guarantors, the Board’s current version of Reg. B is doing 
the exact opposite and is discouraging creditors from considering wives as 
potential guarantors for their husbands’ loans because of the possibility that the 
wife will later allege her guarantee was obtained in violation of the ECOA. 
Therefore, based on the ECOA’s plain language, legislative history, and 
purpose, it is evident that Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed that a 
guarantor does not qualify as an “applicant” under the ECOA. Thus, had the 
Frontenac Bank court conducted a Chevron analysis, it should have concluded 
that Reg. B failed the first step because “there is nothing ambiguous about 
‘applicant’ and no way to confuse an applicant with a guarantor.”203 
2. Step 2: Is the Board’s Interpretation of the ECOA Reasonable? 
Assuming arguendo that Frontenac Bank court found the ECOA’s 
definition of “applicant” was not clear and unambiguous, the second step of the 
Chevron analysis would have required the court to determine whether the 
Board’s interpretation of the ECOA was reasonable.204 As was explained by 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in Champion Bank, the 
Board’s interpretation of the ECOA and the term “applicant” is unreasonable 
because “it leads to circular and illogical results.”205 
Specifically, the Board’s expansive definition of the term “applicant” is 
unreasonable because, by including guarantors in its definition of “applicant,” 
Reg. B allows a guarantor to claim rights under the ECOA while 
 
 201. S. 3492, 93d Cong. (2d Sess. May 14, 1974). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atl. Mkt. Dev. Co., LLC, 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 204. Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 205. Champion Bank v. Reg’l Dev., LLC, No. 4:08CV-1807 CDP, 2009 WL 1351122, at *3 
(E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009). 
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simultaneously allowing a guarantor to assert that she should not be a member 
of the class of people the ECOA is designed to protect.206 In addition to leading 
to circular and illogical results, the Board’s amendment to the definition of 
“applicant” is unreasonable because it was not based on the Board’s 
determination that such an amendment would further the purposes of the 
ECOA. Rather, it was based on the Board’s determination that such an 
expansion would not impose any new burdens on creditors.207 Certainly, such a 
reason does not justify the Board’s decision to impermissibly expand the 
protections of the ECOA. Indeed, the Board seemingly acknowledged that it 
was changing, rather than interpreting, the ECOA when it amended Reg. B’s 
definition of “applicant” to include guarantors by stating: 
The existing regulation prohibits creditors, in certain situations, from requiring 
an applicant to obtain a guarantor . . . [but] [if] a creditor violates this 
provision . . . a guarantor whose signature has been illegally required currently 
has no legal remedy because . . . the [ECOA] confers standing to sue only 
upon an “aggrieved applicant.”208 
As the analysis above demonstrates, Reg. B’s expansion of the term 
“applicant” to include guarantors flouts common sense and is an unreasonable 
interpretation of the ECOA. Consequently, Reg. B fails under the second step 
of the Chevron analysis as well.209 
C. Practical Effects and Consequences of Frontenac Bank 
Although the validity of Reg. B will soon be resolved by the United States 
Supreme Court,210 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District’s 
improper interpretation of the ECOA and Reg. B in Frontenac Bank has had a 
negative effect on local creditors since 2012. As a result of Frontenac Bank, 
between 2012 and 2015, state and federal courts in Missouri interpreted the 
ECOA and Reg. B differently. Thus, a creditor’s ability to enforce a spousal 
guaranty depended solely on whether the creditor’s claim was heard in state or 
federal court.211 This was detrimental to local creditors because, oftentimes, 
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their only recourse was to sue in state court, where it was unlikely a spousal 
guaranty would be held enforceable. Meanwhile, national creditors doing 
business in Missouri could pursue their claims in federal court, where it was 
likely a spousal guarantee would be held enforceable. Therefore, local and 
national creditors who required spousal guarantees under similar circumstances 
achieved different results based simply on the forum in which their claims 
were heard. 
Additionally, the practical consequences of the Missouri Court of Appeals 
for the Eastern District’s decision in Frontenac Bank were frequently observed 
by a prominent local attorney, Joseph J. Trad.212 One of Mr. Trad’s client’s 
creditors reacted to the Frontenac Bank case by informing the client that his 
spouse’s guarantee would no longer be required.213 According to Mr. Trad, the 
creditor’s decision to no longer require the client’s wife’s guarantee likely 
indicated that creditors were unsure of whether or not they were in compliance 
with Reg. B’s spousal signature provisions and, as a result, were reluctant to 
assume the added business risk entailed in obtaining spousal guarantees.214 
Consequently, it is likely that Frontenac Bank prevented commercial 
enterprises which were not creditworthy from being able to obtain financing 
that would have been available prior to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Eastern District’s decision Frontenac Bank.215 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District 
wrongly decided Frontenac Bank and should not have upheld the validity of 
Reg. B’s expanded definition of “applicant.” Specifically, the Frontenac Bank 
court erred by misinterpreting the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Boone 
and by failing to conduct a Chevron analysis to determine the validity of Reg. 
B. Had the Frontenac Bank court correctly interpreted Boone and conducted a 
Chevron analysis, the court would have concluded that Reg. B’s definition of 
“applicant” is invalid (1) because Congress clearly and unambiguously 
expressed that a guarantor does not qualify as an “applicant,” and (2) because 
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the Board’s interpretation of the ECOA and the term “applicant” is 
unreasonable and “leads to circular and illogical results.” 
Under the first prong of Chevron, Reg. B fails because the term 
“applicant” is unambiguously limited to a person who applies for or requests 
credit—i.e. a borrower—and does not include a person who simply gives 
security for a borrower’s debt—i.e. a guarantor. Indeed, because guarantors 
base their ECOA claims on allegations that the creditor improperly required 
their guarantee, they are admittedly conceding that they are not applicants 
because they did not apply for or request anything. Under the second prong of 
Chevron, Reg. B fails because it unreasonably impedes the purpose of the 
ECOA, which is to encourage creditors to include, rather than exclude, women 
(especially wives) from credit transactions. Instead, Reg. B discourages 
creditors from considering a wife’s creditworthiness when extending credit to 
the wife’s husband because of the potential risk that the wife’s guarantee will 
be deemed void and unenforceable. Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” also 
leads to circular and illogical results because it allows a guarantor-wife to 
assert that she should not be a member of the class of people Reg. B is 
designed to protect—i.e. guarantors—and simultaneously allows the wife to 
claim rights under the ECOA as a guarantor. 
Based on the analysis provided by many federal courts and the analysis 
provided by this Note, the Supreme Court of the United States should hold 
Reg. B’s definition of “applicant” to be invalid.216 
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